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Abstract
Local robustness verification can verify that a
neural network is robust wrt. any perturbation
to a specific input within a certain distance. We
call this distance robustness radius. We observe
that the robustness radii of correctly classified in-
puts are much larger than that of misclassified
inputs which include adversarial examples, espe-
cially those from strong adversarial attacks. An-
other observation is that the robustness radii of
correctly classified inputs often follow a normal
distribution. Based on these two observations,
we propose to validate inputs for neural networks
via runtime local robustness verification. Experi-
ments show that our approach can protect neural
networks from adversarial examples and improve
their accuracies.
1. Introduction
Despite the tremendous success (LeCun et al., 2015) of
deep neural networks in recent years, their applications in
safety critical areas are still concerning.
Can we trust neural networks? This question arose
when people found it hard to explain or interpret neural
networks (Castelvecchi, 2016) and drew more attention
since the discovery of adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2014). An adversarial example is an input that is obtained
by adding a small, imperceptible perturbation to a valid in-
put (i.e., correctly classified input), and that is designed to
be misclassified. Recent studies (Ilyas et al., 2019) demon-
strate that adversarial examples are features that widely ex-
ist in common datasets, thus can hardly be avoided. This
means neural networks inherently lack robustness and are
vulnerable to malicious attacks.
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Considerable amount (Yuan et al., 2019) of works have
been proposed to improve the robustness of neural net-
works against adversarial examples. One method is ad-
versarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al.,
2016) which feeds adversarial examples to neural networks
in the training stage. Adversarial training works well on
the types of adversarial examples considered in the training
dataset, but provides no guarantee on other types. Some
works (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Abbasi & Gagne´, 2017) fo-
cus on designing robust architectures of neural networks.
However, similarly to adversarial training, these methods
do not guarantee robustness on all adversarial examples.
One promising solution is formal verification, which can
prove that a network satisfies some formally defined speci-
fications. To give a formal specification on robustness, we
first define a network as f : Rm → C, whereRm is a vector
space of input (e.g., images) and C is a set of class labels.
Then we define robustness radius (Wang et al., 2017) of a
network on an input ~x ∈ Rm as
R(f, ~x) = max{η | ∀~y ∈ Rm, ‖~y − ~x‖p ≤ η ⇒ f(~x) = f(~y)}
where ‖·‖p means Lp norm distance. Robustness radius
measures the region in which a network is robust against
perturbations. Another equivalent definition is minimal dis-
tortion (Weng et al., 2018) (i.e., the minimal distance re-
quired to craft an adversarial example). We prefer to use
the term robustness radius since it is defined from a de-
fensive perspective. With robustness radius, we can define
global robustness property of a network f as
∀~x ∈ Rm,H(~x) = f(~x)⇒R(f, ~x) ≥ δ
where δ is a user-provided threshold andH : Rm → C∪{φ}
denotes the oracle on the classification of Rm. Note that H
outputs φ if an input inRm is not classified into any class in
C. This property ensures that for any input that can be rec-
ognized by human and correctly classified, the neural net-
work is robust to any perturbation to some extent (i.e., δ in
Lp normal distance). Unfortunately, the global robustness
property following this definition can hardly be verified be-
cause of the huge input space and absence of the oracle H.
Some researchers tried to verify global robustness property
of a weaker definition (Katz et al., 2017) (without H), but
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only succeeded on very small networks (i.e., consisting of
a few dozens of neurons).
Given the difficulties in verifying global robustness prop-
erties, many researchers turned to local robustness proper-
ties, i.e., ∀~x ∈ X ⊆ Rm,H(~x) = f(~x) ⇒ R(f, ~x) ≥ δ.
Instead of the whole input space, local robustness prop-
erty only considers a set of inputs (denoted as X in the
formula), for instance, the training dataset. Various tech-
niques (Huang et al., 2017; Gehr et al., 2018; Singh et al.,
2018b; Ehlers, 2017) have been successfully applied in this
kind of verification. However, local robustness properties
are currently only used to evaluate the robustness of a given
network or a defense technique, since they do not provide
guarantee for robustness on inputs outside of the set X.
Can we trust neural networks on a specific runtime input?
Although this question is a compromise to the sad fact that
the global robustness properties can hardly be guaranteed,
it is still practically useful if we can know whether a neu-
ral network gives the expected output on an input at run-
time. Adversarial detection (Lu et al., 2017; Grosse et al.,
2017) rejects inputs that are suspected of being adversarial
examples based on the characteristics observed on known
adversarial attacks. Input reconstruction (Meng & Chen,
2017) tries to transform adversarial examples to the in-
puts that can be correctly classified. Runtime verifica-
tion (Desai et al., 2018) checks whether an output satisfies
some safety specifications at runtime and drops the output
if not (traditional software is used as backup). This method,
however, needs to know the constraints on outputs, which
is not the case in tasks like image classification.
In this paper, we propose to validate inputs at runtime in a
new way, i.e., via local robustness verification, which can
compute the robustness radius of any input (as opposed to
correctly classified inputs only). We utilize robustness ra-
dius as the characterics of inputs to distinguish correctly
classified inputs and misclassified (possibly adversarial) in-
puts. Although it is known that adversarial examples them-
selves are often not robust to small perturbations (Luo et al.,
2018; Wang et al., 2018a), to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to validate inputs by observing robustness
radius. To be specific, we have two observations. The
first is that the average robustness radius of valid inputs
(i.e., correctly classified inputs) is much larger than that
of misclassified inputs, no matter whether adversarial or
not. To be formal, given a neural network f, and a set
of inputs X ⊆ Rm at runtime (which may include adver-
sarial examples), let Xc = {~x ∈ X | f(~x) = H(~x)} and
Xw = {~x ∈ X | H(~x) ∈ C ∧ f(~x) 6= H(~x)}, then we have
∑
~x∈Xc
R(f, ~x)
| Xc |
≫
∑
~x∈Xw
R(f, ~x)
| Xw |
(1)
where | · | denotes cardinality and≫ denotes “much larger
than”. Note that we only consider inputs that can be clas-
sified into labels, which exclude randomly generated in-
puts mapping to no label (i.e., mapped by H to φ). We
believe that this assumption is practical. Our experiments
show that Equation 1 holds on adversarial examples from
all attacks we have tried, especially on those strong attacks
which seek the smallest perturbations.
Another observation is that the robustness radii of valid in-
puts (i.e.,{R(f, ~x) | ~x ∈ Xc} ) follow a normal distribution.
Based on these two observations, we propose a new way of
validating inputs for neural networks. It can reject both ad-
versarial examples and misclassified clean data (i.e., with-
out crafted adversarial examples). Thus it not only protects
neural networks from adversarial attacks, but also improves
their accuracies. More importantly, this way does not need
knowledge of the classification scenario and is not specific
to any attack. We have conducted experiments on Feed-
forward Neural Networks (FNN) and Convolutional Neu-
ral networks (CNN) with three representative attacks, i.e.,
FGSM (fast, white-box) (Goodfellow et al., 2014), C&W
(strong, white-box) (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), and HOP
(i.e., Hopskipjump, black-box) (Chen et al., 2019). The re-
sults demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. To be
more specific, on a random CNN for MNIST (LeCun et al.,
1998), our method can reject 75% misclassified natural in-
puts, 95% and 100% FGSM adversarial examples with dif-
ferent parameters respectively, 100% C&W adversarial ex-
amples and 100%HOP adversarial examples, with only 3%
false alarm rate.
It is worth mentioning that the two observations are valid
not only on exact robustness radius computed by complete
verification, but also on under-approximated robustness ra-
dius computed by incomplete verification, which is fast
enough to be deployed at runtime.
We make the following contributions:
• We observed that, on FNNs and CNNs, the average ro-
bustness radius of the valid inputs is much larger than
that of the misclassified inputs (no matter whether ad-
versarial or not);
• We observed that, on most FNNs and CNNs, the ro-
bustness radii of the valid inputs follow a normal dis-
tribution;
• Based on these two observations, we propose a new
input validation method based on local robustness ver-
ification (which currently is only used to evaluate the
robustness of a given network in existing work, as
opposed to validate inputs), which can protect neural
networks from adversarial examples, especially from
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strong attacks, and improve their accuracies on clean
data.
2. Observation on Robustness Radii of Inputs
from Different Categories
In this section, we show our observation on the robustness
radii of valid (i.e., correctly classified) data, misclassified
clean data and adversarial examples.
2.1. Background and Experimental Setup
Local Robustness Verification. Local robustness properties
ensure that, a neural network is immune to adversarial ex-
amples on a set of inputs within δ in Lp norm distance. To
prove it, we only need to prove that, for given ~x ∈ X and δ,
∀~y ∈ Rm, ‖~y − ~x‖p ≤ δ ⇒ f(~x) = f(~y) (2)
In this paper, we only consider the case p = ∞. Current
verifiers for this property can be categorized as complete
and incomplete. Complete verifiers can give an exact an-
swer on whether the property is satisfied. Most complete
verifiers are based on Mixed Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) (Dutta et al., 2018; Fischetti & Jo, 2018) or Satisfi-
ability Modulo Theories (SMT) (Ehlers, 2017; Katz et al.,
2017). These methods are NP-hard, thus can hardly be ap-
plied to large networks.
Incomplete verifiers only provide conservative answers,
that is, they could return unknown even if the property
holds. Thus incomplete verifiers usually can only verify an
under-approximation of robustness radius. Typical incom-
plete verification methods on neural networks include sym-
bolic intervals (Wang et al., 2018b) and abstract interpreta-
tion (Singh et al., 2019). These methods are much more
scalable than complete ones.
Experimental Setup. We take MNIST (LeCun et al.,
1998) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) as our in-
put datasets and use IBM’s Adversarial Robustness Tool-
box (Nicolae et al., 2018) to generate FGSM, C&W,
and HOP adversarial examples with default parame-
ters, except for FGSM where we set ǫ (i.e., a parame-
ter (Goodfellow et al., 2014)) as 0.1 (by default) and 0.05
(which is stronger) respectively.
We use ERAN (Singh et al., 2018a) as the verifier which
supports both complete and incomplete robustness verifica-
tions. ERAN does not compute robustness radius directly,
but can judge whether the robustness radius is larger than a
given δ (i.e., the network f is robust on all inputs that are
within δ in L∞ norm distance with ~x, as Equation 2). We
denote it as isrobust(f, ~x, δ). Note that, ERAN supports
two versions of isrobust: the complete one and the in-
complete one. Applying binary search on complete (resp.
Algorithm 1 Computation of robustness radius
Input: network f, input ~x, big value up, tolerance e
Initialize low = 0
repeat
mid = (up+ low)/2
if isrobust(f, ~x,mid) then
low = mid
else
up = mid
end if
until up− low < e
Output: low
incomplete) isrobust, we can find a value close enough
to the robustness radius (resp. an underapproximation of
the robustness radius). This algorithm is described in Al-
gorithm 1. In the following, we will call the computed
value with complete verification the (asymptotically) exact
robustness radius, and that with incomplete verification the
approximate robustness radius. All experiments are con-
ducted on an Ubuntu 18.04 running on a desktop with an
Intel i9-9900K CPU, 32GB Memory.
2.2. Observation on Exact Robustness Radius
ERAN combines abstract interpretation, linear program-
ming and MILP to completely verify a network. To make
the verification terminate in a reasonable time, we trained
a small FNN (denoted as FNN-MNIST) on MNIST (with
95.82% accuracy), which consists of 5 layers: the input
layer, three fully connected layers, each with 30 neurons
and one output layer.
We run ERAN with RefineZono (Singh et al., 2018b) do-
main, and set up as 0.256 and e as 0.001 in Algorithm 1.
We computed the robustness radii of the first 100 samples
from each of following six categories in the MNIST test
dataset:
• samples that can be correctly classified by the network
• samples that are misclassifed by the network
• adversarial examples from successful FGSM attack
with ǫ = 0.1
• adversarial examples from successful FGSM attack
with ǫ = 0.05
• adversarial examples from successful C&W attack
• adversarial examples from successful HOP attack
Figure 1(a) shows the number of inputs, the exact robust-
ness radii of which are above a given value (i.e., the x-axis).
We can see that the robustness radii of valid inputs are much
larger than that of the other categories of data, especially
the adversarial examples from the strong white-box C&W
attack and black-box HOP attack. The robustness radii of
adversarial examples from FGSM attack with ǫ = 0.1 are
Input Validation for Deep Neural Networks via Runtime Local Robustness Verification
(a) Exact robustness radius on FNN-MNIST (b) Approximate robustness radius on FNN-MNIST
(c) Approximate robustness radius on CNN-MNIST (d) Approximate robustness radius on CNN-CIFAR
Figure 1. The numbers of inputs which have a larger robustness radius than a given value
significantly larger than those with ǫ = 0.05.
Our experiments suggest that we can use robustness radius
to evaluate to what extent we should trust the output of a
neural network on a given input. By setting a threshold to
reject any input the robustness radius of which is lower, we
can protect the neural network from adversarial examples
and improve its accuracy. However, complete verification
is time-consuming. In our experiments, each call to func-
tion isrobust takes 11s on average, even though our net-
work contains only 100 neurons. It seems that complete
verification can hardly be deployed at runtime, especially
considering that the running time of complete verification
increases exponentially with the number of neurons.
2.3. Observation on Approximate Robustness Radius
Incomplete verification usually runs much faster than com-
plete verification and has the potential to be deployed at
runtime. However, Algorithm 1 with incomplete verifica-
tion can only give an approximate robustness radius. We
would like to know (1) whether approximate robustness ra-
dius from incomplete verification is close to the exact ro-
bustness radius; (2) whether the approximate robustness
radii of valid inputs are significantly larger than that of the
misclassified inputs. Actually the second question is more
important since it decides whether we can use incomplete
verification to validate inputs.
Observation on FNN. We utilize ERANwith DeepZono do-
main (Singh et al., 2018a) (which is incomplete) to com-
pute the approximate robustness radii of the same inputs
on the network FNN-MNIST. The results are shown in
Figure 1(b). Comparing Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b), we
can see that the values of approximate and exact robust-
ness radii of the same inputs are very close (comparing
the x-axis). In fact, the approximate robustness radii (ex-
cept those equal to 0) of all inputs are between 44% and
100% of their exact robustness radii. Moreover, we can see
that, similar to exact robustness radii, the approximate ro-
bustness radii of valid inputs are significantly larger than
that of misclassified inputs. This means, we can utilize
approximate robustness radius to protect neural networks.
Moreover, each call to isrobust in incomplete verification
costs less than 1s on the given network, and has polynomial
time complexity wrt. the number of neurons, which means
it has potential to be deployed at runtime.
Observation on CNN. We have also conducted experi-
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ments on Convolutional Neural Networks. They are sig-
nificantly larger than the network FNN-MNIST, and com-
plete verification methods can hardly compute robustness
radius in a reasonable time. Thus we only tried incom-
plete verification. Our experiments on CNN are conducted
on two datasets: MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and CI-
FAR10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009).
We trained a CNN (denoted as CNN-MNIST) onMNIST of
7 layers: the input layer, a convolutional layer with 6 filters
of size 3×3, a max-pooling layer of (2, 2), a convolutional
layer with 16 filters of size 3 × 3, a max-pooling layer of
(2, 2), a fully connected layer of 128 neurons and an output
layer with 10 labels. The accuracy is 98.62%.
As in Section 2.2, we utilize ERAN with DeepZono do-
main (Singh et al., 2018a) to compute the approximate ro-
bustness radii of the first 100 inputs from each of the six
categories. Figure 1(c) shows the results on CNN-MNIST.
We can see that the computed approximate robustness radii
of all inputs are much smaller (i.e.,≤ 0.04) than those com-
puted on the small network FNN-MNIST. We do not know
whether the approximate robustness radii are close to the
exact robustness radii, which we cannot get even after sev-
eral days of computation. However, most importantly, the
characteristics of approximate robustness radii of inputs of
different categories are the same as exact robustness radii.
That is the approximate robustness radii of valid inputs (i.e.,
the red line) are much larger than that of other inputs. In
fact, if we set the threshold as 0.01, we can reject 75%
misclassified clean data, 95% FGSM adversarial examples
where ǫ = 0.1, 100% FGSM adversarial examples where
ǫ = 0.05, 100% C&W adversarial examples, and 100%
HOP adversarial examples, and only 3% valid inputs.
We trained a LeNet-5 (LeCun et al., 1998) CNN (denoted
as CNN-CIFAR in this paper) on CIFAR10 of 8 layers: the
input layer, a convolutional layer with 6 filters of size 5×5,
a max-pooling layer of (2, 2), a convolutional layer with
16 filters of size 5 × 5, a max-pooling layer of (2, 2), two
fully connected layers of 120 and 84 neurons respectively,
an output layer with 10 labels. The accuracy is 73.66%.
Figure 1(d) shows the results of the first 100 inputs of each
category in CIFAR10 test database. Even the approximate
robustness radii of the valid inputs are significantly larger
than those of misclassified inputs and adversarial examples
from C&W and HOP attacks, but are almost indistinguish-
able from FGSM attacks. We believe that the reason is the
accuracy of the network is too low such that it leaves big
“holes” for adversarial examples in the input space.
To validate our observations, we trained more FNNs and
CNNs of various structures and conducted the same mea-
sure. Table 1 shows the results. In the table, on each net-
work, we show its training dataset (column Dataset), net-
work structure (column Network), where (3 × 30, 101) de-
scribes FNN-MNIST, (6(3,3), 16(3,3), 128, 101) describes
CNN-MNIST and (6(5,5), 16(5,5), 120, 84, 10) describes
CNN-CIFAR. For each network structure, we adopted dif-
ferent activation functions (column Activation). The table
also shows the accuracy on the test dataset (column Acc.)
and the average approximate robustness radii of the first 10
inputs (we chose 10 because we believe that 10 is enough
to compare the average values and generating adversarial
attacks e.g., HOP can be very time-consuming) in the test
dataset of six categories: correctly classified inputs (col-
umn Valid), misclassified inputs (columnMis.), adversarial
examples from FGSM attacks with ǫ = 0.1, FGSM attacks
with ǫ = 0.05, C&W attacks and HOP attacks. The aver-
age running time of each call to isrobust is also recorded
in column Time(s). The column P-value will be explained
later (see Section 4). From the table, we can see that our ob-
servation is valid on all trained networks. Our experiments
can be easily reproduced since we only use open source
tools with a little modification (e.g., Algorithm 1). The
modified code and all trained networks in this paper have
been uploaded to an online repository1. Even though we
believe that people can easily reproduce our experiments
with their own trained networks.
There are CNNs (Hu et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2017) that have
high accuracies on CIFAR10. But these networks usually
adopt layers other than fully-connected, convolutional and
max-pooling layers and are out of the scope of this pa-
per and beyond the ability of current local robustness ver-
ifiers (Katz et al., 2017; Ehlers, 2017; Wang et al., 2018b;
Dutta et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2018a).
(a) FNN-MNIST (b) CNN-MNIST
Figure 2. The numbers of inputs which have a larger minimal dis-
tortion than a given value
We also tried another tool CLEVER (Weng et al., 2018)
which estimates the minimal distortion to craft adversar-
ial examples (which should be equal to robustness radius).
Figure 2 illustrates the robustness radii on the first 100 in-
puts of the six categories on the networks FNN-MNIST
and CNN-MNIST. We can see that, the difference of min-
imal distortions of valid inputs and other categories is less
significant than that of robustness radii in Figure 1. Fig-
ure 3 shows the histogram of the density of the minimal
1https://www.github.com/jiangchaoliu/eran.git
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Table 1. The average robustness radius and p-value of different networks
DATASET NETWORK ACIVATION ACC. VALID MIS. FGSM(0.1) FGSM(0.05) C&W HOP P-VALUE TIME(S)
MNIST 3 × 30, 101 RELU 95.82 0.0227 0.0056 0.0091 0.0066 0.0020 0.0009 0.033 0.242
MNIST 3 × 30, 102 RELU 96.49 0.0183 0.0069 0.0087 0.0065 0.0020 0.0009 0.026 0.239
MNIST 3 × 30, 103 RELU 96.55 0.0194 0.0069 0.0078 0.0048 0.0027 0.0007 <0.001 0.241
MNIST 3 × 50, 10 RELU 96.80 0.0176 0.0047 0.0090 0.0068 0.0013 0.0009 0.140 0.143
MNIST 3 × 100, 10 RELU 97.49 0.0162 0.0070 0.0080 0.0054 0.0023 0.0010 0.916 0.357
MNIST 4 × 100, 10 RELU 97.37 0.0143 0.0076 0.0057 0.0051 0.0019 0.0010 0.091 0.441
MNIST 5 × 100, 10 RELU 97.61 0.0127 0.0057 0.0047 0.0043 0.0013 0.0011 0.082 0.517
MNIST 5 × 200, 10 RELU 97.70 0.0101 0.0054 0.0038 0.0041 0.0027 0.0010 <0.001 1.746
MNIST 3 × 30, 10 SIGMOID 95.26 0.0145 0.0071 0.0074 0.0050 0.0020 0.0011 <0.001 0.251
MNIST 3 × 50, 10 SIGMOID 96.15 0.0130 0.0053 0.0071 0.0050 0.0015 0.0010 0.003 0.156
MNIST 3 × 100, 10 SIGMOID 97.11 0.0115 0.0057 0.0047 0.0043 0.0017 0.0008 0.142 0.408
MNIST 4 × 100, 10 SIGMOID 96.86 0.0101 0.0057 0.0041 0.0042 0.0007 0.0008 0.126 0.551
MNIST 5 × 100, 10 SIGMOID 96.30 0.0102 0.0023 0.0050 0.0024 0.0011 0.0008 0.492 0.670
MNIST 5 × 200, 10 SIGMOID 96.90 0.0086 0.0052 0.0042 0.0033 0.0018 0.0007 0.034 2.720
MNIST 3 × 30, 10 TANH 96.25 0.0081 0.0046 0.0030 0.0020 0.0016 0.0008 <0.001 0.255
MNIST 3 × 50, 10 TANH 96.98 0.0070 0.0032 0.0034 0.0034 0.0008 0.0007 <0.001 0.156
MNIST 3 × 100, 10 TANH 97.42 0.0059 0.0024 0.0034 0.0026 0.0011 0.0007 0.713 0.408
MNIST 4 × 100, 10 TANH 97.80 0.0046 0.0026 0.0017 0.0021 0.0013 0.0008 0.307 0.550
MNIST 5 × 100, 10 TANH 97.62 0.0035 0.0020 0.0024 0.0016 0.0008 0.0007 0.022 0.681
MNIST 5 × 200, 10 TANH 97.52 0.0028 0.0015 0.0015 0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 0.142 2.736
MNIST 6(3,3), 16(3,3) , 128, 101 RELU 98.62 0.0175 0.0064 0.0055 0.0032 0.0021 0.0011 0.828 0.232
MNIST 6(3,3), 16(3,3) , 128, 102 RELU 98.29 0.0188 0.0061 0.0049 0.0040 0.0034 0.0019 0.492 0.253
MNIST 6(3,3), 16(3,3) , 128, 103 RELU 98.45 0.0174 0.0065 0.0051 0.0029 0.0030 0.0019 0.622 0.213
MNIST 3(3,3), 8(3,3), 128, 10 RELU 97.45 0.0239 0.0092 0.0089 0.0080 0.0025 0.0021 <0.001 0.073
MNIST 12(3,3), 32(3,3), 128, 10 RELU 98.99 0.0170 0.0059 0.0051 0.0032 0.0027 0.0019 0.333 0.754
MNIST 6(3,3), 16(3,3), 128, 10 SIGMOID 98.45 0.0178 0.0045 0.0053 0.0045 0.0017 0.0018 0.773 0.344
MNIST 3(3,3), 8(3,3), 128, 10 SIGMOID 97.78 0.0249 0.0081 0.0102 0.0060 0.0037 0.0022 0.068 0.119
MNIST 12(3,3), 32(3,3), 128, 10 SIGMOID 98.85 0.0172 0.0061 0.0038 0.0059 0.0016 0.0019 0.522 1.318
MNIST 6(3,3), 16(3,3), 128, 10 TANH 98.73 0.0039 0.0013 0.0022 0.0015 0.0006 0.0006 0.188 0.369
MNIST 3(3,3), 8(3,3), 128, 10 TANH 98.56 0.0103 0.0036 0.0042 0.0024 0.0014 0.0012 0.314 0.124
MNIST 12(3,3), 32(3,3), 128, 10 TANH 99.11 0.0037 0.0017 0.0024 0.0013 0.0004 0.0006 0.001 1.488
CIFAR10 6(5,5), 16(5,5) , 120, 84, 10 RELU 73.66 0.0017 0.0009 0.0017 0.0016 0.0003 0.0002 0.005 1.680
CIFAR10 6(5,5), 16(5,5) , 120, 84, 10 SIGMOID 65.30 0.0025 0.0014 0.0029 0.0022 0.0005 0.0004 0.839 2.418
CIFAR10 6(5,5), 16(5,5) , 120, 84, 10 TANH 70.68 0.0008 0.0005 0.0009 0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 0.390 2.443
Figure 3. Minimal distortion from CLEVER and exact/approximate robustness radius from ERAN
distortion from CLEVER and exact/approximate robust-
ness radii from ERAN of the first 100 valid inputs on the
network FNN-MNIST. Compared with approximate robust-
ness radii, both the values and distribution of minimal dis-
tortions are much farther from the exact robustness radii.
3. Input Validation with Observation I
Based on our first observation, we can design an algorithm
to validate the inputs of a neural network at runtime to pro-
tect it from adversarial examples and improve its accuracy.
A naive idea is to set a threshold and reject all inputs the
approximate robustness radii of which are below it. How-
ever, it is non-trivial to choose the threshold. One solution
is to set the threshold according to the maximal false alarm
rate that can be tolerated, which depends on the applica-
tion. ROC curve plots the true alarm rate against the false
alarm rate at various threshold settings. Figure 4 shows
the ROC curves of the network CNN-MNIST and CNN-
CIFAR on the first 100 inputs from each category. The re-
sult onMNIST is good on all kinds of adversarial examples.
However, on CIFAR10, our method is not very helpful on
FGSM attacks. The reason, we believe, is that the accuracy
of our CNN on CIFAR10 is not high enough.
Until now, we have only studied the first 100 inputs in each
category. In Table 2, we show the effect of different choices
of thresholds on the network CNN-MNIST on the first 100
and random 100 inputs in each category. To be more spe-
cific, we show with different thresholds (column Th.), the
percentage of rejected valid inputs (column Vic.), the per-
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Table 2. The rejection rates with different thresholds
TH. VIC. W F (0.1) F (0.05) C&W HOP
0.002 0/0 14/14 17/13 27/24 48/47 91/99
0.004 0/0 28/29 42/38 57/56 77/79 100/100
0.006 0/0 49/48 62/59 87/79 89/89 100/100
0.008 2/1 66/69 88/79 100/95 96/99 100/100
0.010 3/4 75/80 95/97 100/99 100/100 100/100
0.012 8/7 89/90 99/100 100/100 100/100 100/100
0.014 13/16 97/95 100/100 100/100 100/100 100/100
0.016 24/28 100/100 100/100 100/100 100/100 100/100
centage of rejected misclassified inputs (column W.), and
the rejected adversarial examples from FGSM attack with
ǫ = 0.1 (column F (0.1)), FGSM attack with ǫ = 0.05 (col-
umn F (0.05)), C&W attack and HOP attack. The result of
the first 100 inputs and random 100 inputs are on the left
and right sides of ”/” respectively in each cell. This table
shows that the observation of the first 100 inputs of each
category are also valid in the whole test database.
(a) ROC curve on MNIST (b) ROC curve on CIFAR
Figure 4. ROC curves on MNIST and CIFAR
The benefit of validation by threshold is that once the
threshold is decided, we just need to call isrobust once to
test whether the approximate robustness radius of an input
is above the threshold.
4. Distribution of The Approximate
Robustness Radius of Valid Inputs
One thing concerns us: if the attackers have the knowledge
of our neural network and our detection method, they can
generate adversarial examples with large approximate ro-
bustness radii on purpose (even though we believe that such
adversarial examples can be hardly found on a neural net-
work with high accuracy). To avoid this, we study further
whether the approximate robustness radii of valid inputs
follow a certain distribution. If they do, then the attackers
not only need to generate adversarial examples with large
enough robustness radii, but also need to make sure that
such robustness radii follow a certain distribution, which is
much harder. Observing Figure 3, one thought is that the
exact/approximate robustness radii follow a normal distri-
bution. To test that, we compute the approximate robust-
Algorithm 2 Validation by distribution
Input: network f, input ~x
Q = a queue (the size of which is s) of valid inputs
repeat
Input: input ~x
Q.append(~x)
if test(Q) then
del Q[0]
else
del Q[s]
end if
until END OF INPUT
ness radii of the first 100 valid inputs for all networks in
Table 1. We test whether they follow a normal distribution
by D’Agostino and Pearson’s test (D’Agostino & Pearson,
1973), which returns a p-value 2 (shown in column P-value).
If the p-value is larger than 0.05, then they are believed
to follow a normal distribution. We can see that 25 net-
works follow normal distributions, but 9 not. We cannot
give a conclusion on what factors make the difference, but
it seems that a medium size network with high accuracy
usually enjoys this property. It is worth mentioning that the
exact robustness radii of the FNN-MNIST network do not
pass the D’Agostino and Pearson’s test either, the same as
its approximate robustness radii, even though they look like
a normal distribution in Figure 3.
5. Input Validation with Observation II
If the approximate robustness radii of the valid inputs on a
network follow a normal distribution, we can utilize this to
improve our input validation method.
The new algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. It maintains
a sliding window (Rebbapragada et al., 2009) of size s con-
taining the inputs believed to be valid. When a new input
comes, the algorithm checks whether it breaks the original
normal distribution by function test. If it does, then this
new input is deleted (delQ[s]), otherwise the first element
is deleted (del Q[0]), thus the window slides. The design
of function test is heuristic, and we propose the one below
Q[s] ≥ σ0 ∨ pvalue(Q[0 : s− 1])− pvalue(Q[1 : s]) ≤ σ1
This function combines our two observations. It returns
true if the approximate robustness radius of the last input
is larger than a threshold σ0 (from Observation I) or the p-
value of the new sliding window pvalue(Q[1 : s]) does
not drop sharply from the last one pvalue(Q[0 : s − 1])
2 In statistics, p-value (or probability value) is the probability
of obtaining the observed results of a test, assuming that the null
hypothesis is correct.
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(from Observation II). However, we do not have a method
to decide the two parameters σ0 and σ1. On the network
CNN-MNIST, we set s = 50, σ0 = 0.014 and σ1 = 0.001.
To test this algorithm, we take 100 valid inputs, 1 misclas-
sified input (because the accuracy is 98.62% ), and 100 ad-
versarial examples from each of the four types of attacks
(which totally makes 400) as the inputs. If all the inputs
come in sequence, our algorithm can reject all adversarial
examples and the misclassified input, with only 3 valid in-
puts rejected. However, if we shuffle the inputs randomly,
the average rejected valid inputs are 5 and adversarial ex-
amples are 28 respectively (by 10 times experiments). Ac-
tually, in both cases, the first condition (Q[s] ≥ σ0) accepts
87 valid inputs and rejects all invalid inputs. The second
condition accounts for other accepted valid inputs and false
positives.
The disadvantage of validation by distribution is that
it needs to compute the approximate robustness radius
with Algorithm 1 which needs several iterative calls to
isrobust, which takes more time. However, the time com-
plexity of isrobust for incomplete verification is polyno-
mial wrt. the number of neurons, and the potential of its
speed is far from fully explored (e.g., GPU is not utilized).
6. Related Work
Some researchers focus on finding new adversarial at-
tacks. According to whether the attackers have all
knowledge about the target neural networks, adversar-
ial attacks can be divided into two types: white-box
attack and black-box attack. Most adversarial attacks
including the first one (i.e., L-BFGS (Szegedy et al.,
2014)) are white-box attacks. White-box attacks can be
fast (e.g., FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014)) and strong
(i.e., to find the adversarial examples close to the
original inputs, e.g., DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016), C&W (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), Ground-truth at-
tack (Carlini et al., 2018)). Black-box attacks usually
need more computational power (e.g., Hopskipjump at-
tack (Chen et al., 2019), ZOO (Chen et al., 2017)). Be-
cause of transferability (Papernot et al., 2016), white-box
attacks can be transformed to black-box.
There are many countermeasures for adversarial attacks,
among which, verification and adversarial detection are
mostly related to our work.
Verification methods check whether a neural network satis-
fies a given formally defined property before it is deployed.
Such properties include safety constraints (Katz et al.,
2017) and robustness (Ehlers, 2017; Dutta et al., 2018).
However, due to the non-linearity of activation functions,
complete verification is NP-hard, and thus can hardly scale.
Incomplete verification sacrifices the ability to falsify a
property so as to gain performance. Current incomplete
verifiers (Wang et al., 2018b; Singh et al., 2019) can deal
with neural networks of thousands of neurons in seconds.
However, both verifications can only prove local robustness
properties (Huang et al., 2017), rather than global robust-
ness properties. Thus these verifiers can only give metrics
on evaluating how robust a neural network is, rather than
proving that a neural network is robust.
Adversarial detection methods make use of characterics of
adversarial examples. (Feinman et al., 2017) found that the
uncertainty of adversarial examples to be higher than clean
data, and utilized a Bayesian neural network to estimate
that. (Song et al., 2017) found the distribution of adversar-
ial examples is different from clean data. Compared to their
methods focusing on the inputs, our method computes the
accumulative gradients information of the neural network
in the regions around the inputs. (Wang et al., 2018a) pro-
posed to detect adversarial examples by mutation test based
on the belief that they are not robust to mutations. Their
method shares the similar intuition with our method, that
is, the adversarial examples must be some corner cases in
the input space. However, we utilize local robustness veri-
fication which takes the whole region around an input into
account instead of testing which considers some points near
an input. (Lu et al., 2017) distinguishes adversarial exam-
ples from clean data by the threshold of their values on each
ReLU layer. (Henzinger et al., 2019) proposed to detect
novel inputs by observing the hidden layers, i.e., whether
they are outside the value ranges during training. Given
the fact that these works are not open source and the re-
sults in their papers are often given in the form of graphs
(like ROC curve), it is hard to have a fair comparison with
their results. However, from the results in their papers, our
method is comparable (if not better) with their work, espe-
cially on strong attacks. Our method utilizes only the value
of robustness radius to validate inputs, and can also be seen
as an anomaly detection technique (Chandola et al., 2009).
7. Conclusion
Exact/approximate robustness radius reflects the accumu-
lative gradients information of the neural network in the
region around an input. We believe that adversarial exam-
ples are often in the region with high accumulative gradi-
ents. Based on this belief, we observed the exact/approxi-
mate robustness radii of inputs of valid inputs and misclas-
sified (possibly adversarial) inputs. We found that (1) the
exact/approximate robustness radii of valid inputs are much
larger than those of misclassified inputs and adversarial ex-
amples; (2) the approximate robustness radii of valid in-
puts can follow a normal distribution. Based on the two
observations, we proposed a new way for input validation.
Our experiments showed that the method is very effective
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in improving the accuracy of neural networks and protect-
ing them from adversarial examples. Moreover, we believe
that even if the attackers know our methods, they can hardly
attack the protected neural networks by generating adver-
sarial example, the approximate robustness radii of which
are large enough and follow a normal distribution.
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